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STUDENT NOTES
PUBLIC UTILITIES; THE INFLUENCE OF NEBBIA v. PEOPLE'
ON STATE REGULATION
It Is the intent of this note to review the outstanding cases' on
state regulation in an attempt, not only to present a concise historical
analysis of the field,* but also to In this way clarify the attitude of the
court as reflected in the principal case.
Although it is customary to treat the historical field cursorily
this background is of the utmost importance to a clear presentation of
the complete picture and to an understanding of the later developments. At common law the surgeon, victualler, tailor, smith, baker,
miller, Innkeeper, ferryman, carrier, and wharfinger were all subject
to such regulation. Of these, the first five were so regulated because
of their peculiar power at that time over the public by virtue of the
nature of their services, the scarcity of competition, and the power4
which this gave them to exact exorbitant prices for their services.
These five we may regard as being worthy of note only because of
their importance to the life of that day, which decreased with an
advancing civilization to escape the scrutiny of subsequent courts.'
The last five set out, with a greater tenacity maintained their position
to become the source from which later decisions drew their analogies.
An inspection of the component factors giving these five their continued
place In the eyes of the law will prove fruitful. The miller and ferryman originally held grants or franchises, for which privileges they
were subject to regulation;O and, in the case of the carrier and
wharfinger a virtual monopoly existed by which they lost their pri1291 U. S. 502 (1933).
2Only Supreme Court decisions are reviewed as final adjudication
is necessary to show, in the last analysis, what theory the court has
or has not accepted.
3 See 28 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 149 for interesting suggestion as to the
original contemplation of the field. The question presents itself,
whether or not the police power embraces the businesses "affected with
a public Interest", or whether or not those businesses are regulated
under a separate and distinct power "above" and "beyond" the police
power? What part did the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment play
in developing this distinction recognized by the courts? Is such a distinction, and the police power, a creature of our Constitution? See
Wolff v. The Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 536 (1923) for distinction;
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 355 (1928). For the purposes of this
note we shall look upon the police power as imposing a negative duty
on an individual or a business not to use his property in a certain way,
whereas those businesses considered to be "affected with a public
Interest", because of their peculiar relation to the public, are imbued
with an affirmative duty to use their property in a certain way.
'1 Wyman, Public Service Corporations (1911), Sec. 6-10.
'Wolff Packing Co. v. The Court of Industrial Relations of the
State of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 535 (1923).
61 Wyman, op. cit. supra note 4, sec. 11-15.
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vate nature and, as was said in the case of the latter, became
".. . affected with a public interest and they ceased to be Juris privati
only." 7 The innkeeper has always been subject to such regulation, not
because of a public grant, or franchise, nor because of a monopoly, but
simply because of the indispensable nature of his relationship with the
public, and the importance of his business to transportation and communication. 8 In summation it may be said that all owe an unusual
duty to the public to deal with all who come; to charge only a reasonable price; and to be subject to such regulation as the state deems
fit. From their nature it may be seen that all are of fundamental
importance to the state's welfare. They are peculiar also In that
they (1) operate under a franchise (2) are a virtual monopoly and
(3) are of integral importance to travel or transportation.
Upon these cases the courts proceeded to build the doctrine of
state regulation9 which resulted in Nebbia v. People.
In 1876, the
court with a strict, though tenuous, historical analogy, laid the foundation for one of its vaguest and most illusory fields. In Munn v. Illinois
the business of operating grain elevators for the purpose of trans.
ferring and storing grain was held to be a "business affected with a
public interest"," "devoted to a public use", and, standing "in the
gateway of commerce" took toll from all who passed. With this radical
departure, although closely aligning the ancient and accepted historical
cases, the court laid the ground work for broad regulatory powers."
Recourse was had to the common carrier cases, looking upon the elevators as a vital link in the transportation system; to the existence
of a virtual monopoly; and, as being held out to the public and all who
came, as affecting the business with a public interest.
Following Munn v. Illinois, and closely hewing to the line prescribed by it, was Budd v. New York," reiterating the familiar terms
of common carrier, 4 warehouseman," and monopoly,'8 and nullifying
the need of a grant of privileges. It was at this point that a questionable use of stare decisis, in Brass v. North Dakota,"7 abrogated the
monopoly feature 8 Although the business regulated was the same,
'Lord Hale's famous phrase from De Portibus Marls.
81 Wyman, op cit. supra note 4, sec. 12.
'As to whether or not this power should be denied In any specific
business, see, Willoughby, The Constitution of the United States (1928),
sec. 1158, which draws the distinction.
1094 U. S. 113 (1876).
- Id., at 125.
1I2., at 140 (dissent).
143 U. S. 517 (1892).
-Id., at 533.
"Ia., at 536.
"Id., at 532.
"153 U. S. 391 (1894).
"Although this case is in its essence contradictory to the pronounced opinion of the court in other decisions, nevertheless it holds
that if a business, in one set of circumstances for certain enumerated
reasons is subject to regulation, the same business in another and
different set of circumstances is nevertheless subject to such regulation. But see Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1933).
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that of storing grain, there were some 600 such warehouses owned by
125 Individuals and corporations. The court said ". . . (it) is said that
in North Dakota are not
the modes of carrying on this business ...
similar to those pursued in the eastern cities . . . and great stress is
laid upon expressions used in our previous opinions, in which this
business is spoken of as a practical monopoly. . . these arguments are
disposed of . . . (as) the facts rehearsed are matters for those who
make, not those who interpret the laws.""m The confusion into which
the courts must plunge, to emerge with the criteria for which we
search, is now apparent. The standard is necessarily intangible and
unpredictable, as the court conscientiously reminds us from case to
case."
The case of The German Alliance Insurance Go. v. Lewiuqs removed
any extant doubt as to the property to be regulated, saying," "the
principle was expressed as to property, but it is ... the business that
is the fundamental thing", property being but the instrument for
service. The court goes on to say that the efficiency and solvency of
Insurance companies is of great public concern; that business necessity
impels, if not compels, the public to accept rates arbitrarily set; and,
furthermore, that because of the fact that the public, and not the business, actually pays the losses, an insurance contract is of far greater
2
public consequence than a private contract. ' In this way the court
permitted an impairment of the right of contract, for the public good.
In an attempt to clarify the maze of legal verbiage, Chief Justice
Taft, In Wolf v. Industrial Court, 5 presented the classification to which
Although its explanatory worth
clung.
gratefully
subsequent opinions
is negligible, it serves to break up the field into its logical parts, into
which would naturally fall different sets of facts. The businesses which
were so "affected with a public interest" were:
(1)
Those which were carried on under authority of'a public
grant of privileges ... (2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from
earliest times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by legislation for regulating all trades.... (3) Business which though not
public at its inception may fairly be said to have risen to be such
and had become subject in consequence to some governmental
regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to
the public that it is superimposed upon them. In the language of
the cases the owner by devoting his business to the public use, in
11Id., at 403. This would seem to say that the question in such
situations is one for the legislature, which in effect would decide
whether or not it had the right to decide if a business was so affected.
This is positively denied in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 433 (1927);
Wolf v. The Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 539 (1923); and Nebbia v.
The People, 291 U. S. 502 (1933).
Z Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 429 (1927); Wolff v. Industrial
Court, 262 U. S. 522, 538 (1923).
233 U. S. 399 (1914).
=Id., at 408 [Reference is to Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).]
Id., at 417.
Id., at 413.
262 U. S. 522 (1923).
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effect grants the public interest in that use and subjects
himself
to public regulation to the extent of that interest."'

Groups (1) and (2) cause little difficulty, simple analogy permitting
the regulation of gas, water, electricity, railroads, canals, taxicabs,
porters, etc.2 But, in group (3) almost insuperable difficulties are
found confronting the court. It is here that monopoly, carriers, franchise, grant, "devoted to a public use", and, "affected with a public
interest", are the cynosure of the court. Those indefinable terms are
the ephemeral course along which must follow reluctant decisions. As
is obvious, of all these catch-phrases, none is of prime Importancewhether it be "monopoly", "devoted to a public use", or "franchise";
"affected with a public interest" being a mere euphemism to justify
the upholding or overruling of a case.2
We now have before us the leading cases in which It has been
held that the public had such an interest as to warrant a regulation
of that business by the imposition of affirmative duties. Before inspecting those cases which deny the public that special interest, let us
summarize the requirements as expressed by the cases. It is unnecessary to point out that in no two different sets of facts is the standard
alike. First, we recall that a business operating by reason of a franchise or public grant is subject to such regulations,2 as is one operating
as a virtual monopoly. Those businesses engaged as common carriers,
or fundamentally important thereto, are likewise subject to this control. 0 From here we go into the field of tenuously inductive analogy.
If it has once been adjudged constitutional to regulate a business in one
set of circumstances, it is therefore constitutional to regulate a similar
business in another and entirely different set of circumstances.' When
a business has been "devoted to a public use" this interest again pursues it.2 This includes those enterprises from which the public has a
right to. demand services. Where the theory of competition has failed
to protect the public from the overly acquisitive instincts of an owner
of a basically essential business, the state again steps in.u "In nearly
all the businesses included in the third head above (of Mr. Justice
Taft's classification) the thing which gave the public interest was the
indispensible nature of the service and the exorbitant charges and arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected without regulation."14 And so, when it is deemed comparable to previous opinions,
the court considers the instant case "affected with a public interest"
and subject to regulation. To add to this confusion, in one case the
court said, " .. a business might be affected with a public interest so
as to permit regulation although no public trust was imposed upon
-1d., at 535.
27Wyman, op. cit. supra note 4, Sees. 92, 94, 114, 122, 124.
8Holmes, dissent in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 445 (1927).
'Wolff v. The Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 538 (1923).
30Wyman, op. cit. supra note 4, Chap. 5.
n Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391 (1894).
2Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
uTyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 433 (1927).
" Wolff v. The Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 538 (1923).
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the property and although the public might not have a legal right to
demand and receive service ..."
And now to Inspect the "negative" side of the problem, as pointed
out in the decisions denying such regulation. Tyson v. Banton," holding unconstitutional a statute which attempted to set a maximum price
on the sale of theatre tickets, will serve to narrow down a seemingly
all enveloping field. It was there held that a ticket-selling agency was
nothing more than an appendageO of the theatre, and that the real
question Involved was whether every entertainment is subject to such
regulation. In denying this contention the court said that a business
Is not "affected with a public interest" merely because it is large;
because the public is concerned over its continued operation and
derives benefit, accommodation, or enjoyment from its existence; or
the legislature declares it to be so affected.-' A further line was drawn
suggesting the fundamental difference between the police power and
the state's power to regulate private business as "quasi-public", and,
"not strictly private",10 which terms failed to fit the court's construction of "affected with a public interest" so as to permit regulation as
a "public servant" business. The court points out that attempts to
define "affected with a public interest" have resulted in little more
than paraphrases which themselves necessitated explanation.
In holding the industry of meat-packing not subject to such
control,4 Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the court, said: ". . . the
axpression 'clothed with a public interest', as applied to a business
... In the sense of Munn v. Illinois and the other cases, must be such
as to create a peculiarly close relation between the public and those
engaged in it, and raise implications of an affirmative obligation on
It is also
their part to be reasonable in dealing with the public."'
pointed out that such businesses as the butcher, the baker, the tailor,
the woodchopper, the mining operator, or the miner are not subject to
such regulation, and one so occupied does not affect his business with
a public interest merely because he makes these commodities for the
public."
Again, in ruling that an employment agency" was not subject to
such regulation, the court pointed out that most assuredly the business
was subject to regulation under the police power of the state,4 but that
It did not come under the Taft classification as a business "affected with
a public interest" so as to permit the more stringent regulation accorded
a business owing the public a "public service". The court saw fit to
'5Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 433 (1927).
*Id., at 427.
'7Id., at 430.
2MId., at 431.
" I., at 430.
401M., at 430, 431.
"Wolff v. The Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
1Id., at 536.
3 Id., at 537.
"Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
"Id., at 355.
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liken the agency to a ticket-broker, showing to what flimsy analogies
the courts have resorted in this field, to support their adverse holding.
Yet one more case awaits our inspection before turning to the
Instant case. In The New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,46 the court held
that the making of ice was not a business so affected. The court points
out that the business neither operates under a grant, nor are there
natural conditions which tend to monopoly.'
The main distinction
drawn seems to be that the business is not essential to a large part of
the population; that is, that they do not individually engage therein so
as to be personally involved.48 The court furthermore states that:
"(nothing) is more settled than that it is beyond the power of the
state under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily (to) interfere with private business ... or impose unreasonable and unnecessary
restrictions ...
49
And so we see that although all businesses are subject to reglementation in a negative manner which denies them the right to use their
property in a certain way to the public's detriment, very few have been
treated as subject to that particular power the state exercieas over
those "affected with a public interest". The size of the business, the
fact that the public is interested in its welfare, and derives benefit,
pleasure, entertainment or services from it does not vest it with this
responsibility.w It is also of little import that the legislature has
taken upon itself to bring a business under such control.5 ' Evidently
the deciding factor is a far deeper and more profound one. It has in
all cases been a business which affected a large and important part of
the population, and then even though the thing attempted to be so
regulated is on the face of it of the utmost importance to the public,
If there has not been present some danger of abuse, the regulation has
not been allowed.
With this as a general background we are now ready to inspect
the principal case, Nebbia v. People. In this case the New York legislature, by statute, set up a Milk Control Board with the power, among
other things, to set a maximum and minimum price to be charged by
retailers to consumers for the consumption of milk off the premises.
The Board set the price at nine cents a quart. Nebbia, the proprietor
of a grocery, sold two quarts and a five cent loaf of bread for eighteen
cents, and was convicted of violating the Board's order. On appeal he
asserted that the statute and order contravened the equal protection
clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In allowing the state of New York to regulate the milk industry,
the court completely ignored the phraseology of the previous decisions.
In aiding the court to reach its decision, an exhaustive report of conditions for a period covering several preceding years was made use
48285 U. S. 262 (1932).
17 1d., at 277, 278.
Id., at 276.
Id., at 278.
**Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 431 (1927).
"Id., at 430.
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of. 2 This report showed that it had been found necessary to control
the industry, one engaged in by an extremely large and important part
of the population, for several years; that such regulation had not been
satisfactory in its results; that the commodity was one of prime
importance to the health and welfare of the public; that the economic
policy of "laissez faire" had failed to function in this particular
instance to such a degree that the danger of a failure of supply to the
public was imminent; and, that the difficulty was chronic and not
temporary.
At first blush it would seem that the court, to put it mildly, had
experienced a drastic reversal in its attitude, especially In view of the
fact that the same court, without any change in personnel had but little
more than a year ago delivered the opinion in The New State lce case
in the now archaic language of the old decisions. The court immediately admits that the industry is in no way a monopoly; that it is
dependent upon no public grant or franchise for its right to operate;
and, furthermore, that it is not a public utility in the accepted sense
of the term.P In place of our old catch-all "affected with a public
interest", we find ". . . if one embarks on a business which public
interest demands shall be regulated, he must know regulation will
ensue.""
This new wording of the old euphemism set out long ago in
Munn v. Illinois is thus put on record by way of explaining that the
statute involved will prevent ruthless competition from destroying the
wholesale price structure on which the farmer depends for his liveliTo forcehood, and the community for an assured supply of milk.
fully convey the attitude of the court it is advisable to quote copiously
from the opinion wherein it goes on to explain its understanding of
the meaning of the constitutional restriction concerned in the problem.
"The phrase 'affected with a public interest', can, in the nature
of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason
is subject to control for the public good%. . So far as the requirement of due process is concerned . . a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by regulation adapted to its purpose" . . . (There) is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest, and the function of the courts is
the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory."53
"... (If) the lawmaking body within its sphere of government
concludes that the conditions and practices in an industry make
unrestricted competition and inadequate safeguard of the consumer's interest, produce waste harmful to the public, threaten ulti"Nebbia
OId., at
"Id., at
Id., at
"Id., at
SId., at
"Id., at

v. The People, 291 U. S. 502, 516, 517, 518 (1933).
531.
534.
530.
536.
537.
536.
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mately to cut off the supply of a commodity needed by the public,
or portends the destruction of the industry itself, appropriate statutes passed in an honest effort to correct the threatened consequences may not be set aside ... and this is particularly so where,
as here, the economic maladjustment . . . threatens harm to the
producer at one end of the series and the consumer at the other.""
It would seem that the court here attempted to escape from the
unsatisfactory phraseology of previous holdings in the hope of making
the issue in the future of a more concrete and determinable nature.
There was undoubtedly an urgent need for this, as the accepted terminology had resulted in a mere play on words, which of themselves were
of little aid to the court in reaching a decision. It is to be feared
though, that the subject is one inherently incapable of definition, and
past the realms of prediction. It has proved itself a gap in the law
which may be filled only by the tedious rationalization of individual
situations as they arise."
Although the style of the case, as reflected by the change of approach, is in itself a radical departure from the accepted theory, it Is
suggested that the attitude is not as sweeping and general as might
first appear. As is pointed out in the case ". . . a regulation valid for
one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for
another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances,
because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts."'" At another place it is said: "if its (the legislature's) laws
passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements
of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functis officio".8
Although this is a five-four decision it would be difficult to reconcile
the apparent swing to the left of the court under any other interpretation of the case. It would seem that the answer lies in the possible
future construction applied by the court. Although the language Is
seemingly broad and general, the thought suggests itself that the court
merely forcefully states what was already apparent, i. e., that any business is subject to regulation where its importance is of such a fundamental and essential nature to the public at large. It is perhaps safe
to hazard that in the future the language pointed out above will replace
the lip-service previously rendered by the old familiar phrases, to
effect the same result where the court feels that the business in question should not be subjected to such control.
It is therefore suggested that in the future where It is felt by the
court that a business should not be so regulated, that business will be
considered not subject to control for lack of "adequate reason";"
91d., at 538.
61Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 429, 430 (1927); Wolff v. The
Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 538 (1923).
61d., at 525.
"Id., at 537.
-Id., at 536.

STUDENT NOTES

because the law is "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious";" that the
means selected do not have a "real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained";0 that the law passed does not have a
"reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose"; ®' or, that the lawmaking body is not acting "within its sphere of government".
Great stress is placed upon the economic factors involved, the real
theme of the court appearing to be that when the theory of free
economic competition has failed in a particular industry of vital importance to the public, by virtue of the importance of that industry to
the public it is subject to regulation as a business owing the "public
service" previously restricted to public utilities. In any such situation
the court holds the power of final decision, and will pass upon the
propriety of the intended control. In this field the court is essentially
engaged in reading into the economic theory of the day the credo of the
time, which by its natilre is subject to the vagaries of contemporary
theory. For these reasons it seems that the personnel of the court and
the social concepts of the day are the prime factors in predicting the
trend of future decisions. As the occasion for such regulation infrequently arises, it is to be doubted that the leanings of the court in any
particular case, or series of cases, will prove binding upon subsequent
opinions.
JOHN B. BRcINRMGE.

CRIMINAL LAW-THE STANDARD OF CARE IN CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-MANSLAUGHTER.
The problem with which we are confronted here is to distinguish
and develop that criterion which might be recommended to the courts
for determining what degree of care is necessary in order for one to be
exempt from criminal punishment after having committed a negligent
act which has been the direct cause of death to another.
There are two leading theories which tend to define such a standard,
and, though other theories may be worth consideration, we shall deal
only with these two since this is a practical problem which must be
dealt with without indulging in theoretical gestures which have no
practical significance today. The first, and that which is generally
recognized and used as the standard in the majority of the jurisdictions
today, is the theory that criminal negligence can be imputed only to
that conduct which denotes an "utter disregard for the lives and safety
of others".' This may be termed the gross negligence theory. The
second theory, and one which has gained a foothold in our judicial
system, is the principle that "that degree of care must have been exercised which an ordinary prudent man would have exercised under like
circumstances". 2 This latter is the tort theory of negligence applied
"Id.,
Id.,
"Id.,
Id.,

at
at
at
at

K. L. J.-7
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525.
537.
538.

